Gagarin opens with a brief (35 page) "Introduction" that, with the partial exception of the segment on Language and Style (24-35), is obviously intended for an elementary audience. There is little here for the specialist, and so it is largely thus that this "Introduction" must be judged.

Gagarin repeats views he has argued at length elsewhere. So, he continues (5f.) in the belief that Antiphon of Rhamnus (Kirchner, PA 1304; cp. Thuc. 8.66.1), the author of our speeches, is identical with Antiphon the Sophist (D-K., Vorsokr. 87; see now Decleva Colzi, CPP 1.4, 1989, 176-222). This question of the identity of Antiphon is complex—too complex, indeed, for the elementary reader—and the result is that Gagarin's discussion is slightly unfocused. It is also somewhat misleading: the arguments against his unitarian position, while not absolutely conclusive, remain quite strong, and students would be more accurately served had Gagarin struck a more agnostic note. Certainly, it is not correct to refer to Thuc. 8.68 as the "most compelling" piece of evidence; Thuc. 8.68 compels nothing either way.

Gagarin reiterates (5f.) his support for the authenticity of those short model speeches known as the Tetralogies (Ant. 2, 3, and 4). Here, the specifics of the debate are readily grasped, and might have been presented profitably to Gagarin's readers (as, e.g., Gernet, Antiphon. Discours [Paris, 1923], 6-16).

Unfortunately, Gagarin's discussion is brief and remains too general. Of all the issues raised in connection with the authenticity of the Tetralogies, the most important concern what appear to be discrepancies between Attic law as actually practiced and, on the other hand, certain specifics mentioned by the Tetralogies. Of these, the most intractable has been a reference (3.2.9, etc.) to a "law" (δόμος), that seems to prohibit all types of homicide, both just and unjust (μηδε δίκαιος μηδε δίκαιος), which appears to conflict with the provision, sufficiently attested for Attic law, allowing that certain types of homicide were indeed justifiable (δικαίως) and would not be punished. Like others, Gagarin argues (pp. 8, 24, 151f.), and has argued (GRBS 19, 1978, 291-306), that the δόμος of 3.2.9 was not intended by the author to be taken as an actual "law", but was instead meant to be seen only as a moral injunction or rhetorical flourish. Gagarin has had many takers. Yet the "law" in question appears to be cited and utilized as if it were an actual law and, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, Gagarin's analysis of the passage (3.2.9)—as a rhetorical or moralizing flourish not essential to the argument—is, in any event, untenable.

Such discrepancies, of course, if admitted, hardly prove that the Tetralogies are not the work of Antiphon. They can as easily be explained by the supposition that the Tetralogies are rhetorical set-pieces or school

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1 Still, the comment that "there has not been a commentary on all the speeches in any language since that of Maximen in 1836" (ix), while strictly true, obscures the fact that much good work has been done on the speeches and the Tetralogies individually; notably J. H. Thiell, Antiphon's Erste Tetralogie (Grossingen, 1932); A. Burigaz, Antifonis Prima oratione and Secund oratione (Firenze, 1955); F. Decleva Colzi, Antiphonis Tetralogiai (Milano, 1969); M. Edwards - S. Usher, Greek Orators I: Antiphon and Lysias (Warminster, 1985), 30-124 (by Edwards) on Ant. V. Gagarin makes good use of this prior work. For a recent English translation of the speeches, see M. Gagarin - D. M. MacDowell, tr., Antiphon and Authorised (Aosta, 1998).

2 See, e.g., I.C. Avery, "One Antiphon or Two?", Hermes 110, 1982, 155-36. Even R. Senkew, "The Tetralogies Attributed to Antiphon", TAPA 114, 1984, 75f., who otherwise doubts the authenticity of the Tetralogies, is unsure of how to respond. In fact, both critics (Gernet, 10-12) and defenders (Decleva Colzi, 21f., 31ff.) of the Tetralogies have taken similar approaches, denying that δόμος here signifies an actual "law".

3 See A. Tulle, Dile Philonon: The Right of Presumption and Antic Homicide Procedure, BrSt 76 (Smigtis u. Leipzig, 1996), 85f.n.227. Full discussion of this passage must be reserved for another occasion.
exercises. Even so, we ought not go so far as Gernet’s (16) “enfin que des exercices d’école supposent une école, donc un professeur”. The evidence that Antiphon of Rhamnus was some type of teacher, whether of Thucydides, as was often supposed, or of others—a view that Gagarin himself continues to endorse (pp. 4, 25, 33; also GRBS 35, 1990, 29ff.)—is extremely tenuous (see G. Pendrick, GRBS 54, 1993, 219ff., esp. n.18) and ought probably to be abandoned.

The next section of the “Introduction”, on Law and Rhetoric (9-24), offers less scope for controversy, and Gagarin’s treatment here is more even-handed. There is a brief and excellent account of Athenian law (9-13); his views (21ff.) on the purely rhetorical use of the prokœtises (see CP 91, 1996, 1-18) are, on the whole, persuasive; comments (22ff.) on the tetralogist’s manipulation of the doctrine of miasma are worthy of further development. On the other hand, the sections on argumentation (13-21) are somewhat puzzling. For example, though he announces the importance of the so-called eikos-argument for Antiphon, Gagarin fails to discuss this mode of argumentation as such, and launches instead into a brief account (14) of what he likes to call (MH 47n.3; CP 85, 1990, 30) the “reverse eikos-argument”. Indeed, we never do get a systematic account of eikos, nor of arguments from probability generally, though references to it are scattered throughout the book. Similarly, there is only passing reference to ethopolia (16; cp. Edwards, 69), little or nothing on enthymemes, argumenta ex contrario, and the like, and little interest is shown in the rhetorical commonplace (Gemeinplätze) that might have been collected and catalogued in a work of this sort. In sum, the basics are often ignored, which, given the audience envisioned, severely restricts the utility of this section of the “Introduction”.

The section on style (24-35) is the fullest and, thus, the best part of the “Introduction”. There are useful discussions of diction, syntax, word order, and other stylistic features, though Gagarin might have collected more instances to illustrate his points; not everyone will have Cuceu’s Essai sur la langue et le style de l’orateur Antiphon (1886) to hand. Analysis of the import of certain stylistic features, such as periphrasis (29) or variation (Antiphon “frequently implies by variation that reality is not so neatly comprehended” [31]), is not persuasive. The “Introduction” closes, finally, with an attempt to explain the stylistic differences between the genuine speeches (Ant. 1, 5, and 6) and the Tetralogies as due to the advent of “written communication” (32ff.).

Gagarin does not show much interest in the manuscript tradition, which (admittedly) was long ago established on a sound basis. Such neglect is excusable in a work of this sort. In accord with the general format of the series, use of apparatus criticus is spartan. Gagarin notes (35) the two primary witnesses (A and N), and distinguishes between the two correctors of A, A' and A^2, though more ought to have been said about the importance of A^2, which ceases abruptly at 5.84, relative to A (“pleno di errori”) and A' (which latter seems to be the scribe of A itself; the corrections in N, on the other hand, have little value). Gagarin also claims (Pref. ix) to have used collations of A and N made “some years ago” by Prof. James Zeitzel. This claim, strangely, is hard to evaluate, since Gagarin does not once indicate (so far as I can see) where his text is in any way indebted to this new source of information. Gagarin’s apparatus, it turns out, differs from Thalheim-Blass only in 11 places, and not all of these differences are real. In fact, it appears that Gagarin, having previously (Introd. 35) distinguished the correctors of A, as A^1 and A^2, now proceeds to confute them (under the name “A^2”) in the apparatus. While this is nowhere stated, it is inferred from the fact that the apparatus never mentions A^1, and from Gagarin’s note ad 6.21 om A^2: om. A, om A^2, where Thalheim had written prophetae tempitani: om. A (supra versum), N pr, om cor. N. As noted above, A^2 breaks off at 5.84; Thalheim’s “A (supra versum)”, of course, is A^1. This confusion of the correctors (if I diagnose correctly Gagarin’s procedure) explains divergencies in the apparatus at another five locations: ad 6.23 (ελον N); 2.26 εΙ των A^2, which Thalheim (also Decl. Caizzi) ascribes to A^1; 4.1.2 τροφάς τε A^2: τροφάς καὶ ἀν (Gagarin), with which cp. Thalheim’s τε καὶ NA pr, κατ’ erasum in A (also Decl. Caizzi, 238, "Aggr arg...: κατ’ A"); 4.3.5 om. A^2 (Gagarin), NA^1 (Decl. Caizzi); 5.16 υπελειπότα τοιοθέτην AN, where Thalheim (who prints υπελειπον) placed in his apparatus υπελειπον NA pr, ras. corr. Apart from these six passages, 5.37 ται A^2 (cp. Thalheim’s τοιοθέτην NA pr, ras. corr.) is given thus by Edwards; 5.39 τρελαλος (A^2) is presumably a proof-reading error: this leaves only two passages where new ms. readings may possibly have been offered to us: 5.39 (where Gagarin has εξεγερει Α: εξεγερει N, while Thalheim [also Edwards] gives εξεγερει NA pr, εξεγερει ras. corr.). 2.9.3 (φανερος A^2: so, by implication, Thalheim; but cp. Decl. Caizzi φανερος A pr: φανερος NA^1)—either of which may be due to confusion—and 5.51, where there clearly seems to be some new information offered (though it is of little importance), but whose source is again not divulged. A very minor fault, indeed! If this is all that was to be gained by consulting fresh collations of the manuscripts, then we have here a fine confirmation, albeit indirect, of the view of Declae Caizzi (87) that "[u]n edizione delle Tetralogie di Antifonte non richiedeva nè una nuova collazione dei codici, nè un esame generale della tradizione manoscritta per ricostruire lo stemma. A ciò hanno provveduto i precedenti editori... con risultati... definitivi".

Gagarin says (35) that the text he presents "is generally conservative, in that it resists the tendency of earlier editors to normalize Antiphon's language..."
by emendation.2 In general, it is closest to Thalheim’s for the court speeches, to Declève Calzzi’s for the *Tertalogies.*' 3 In fact, the text is not nearly as conservative as these comments might suggest. Gagarin frequently departs from Thalheim-Blass and Declève Calzzi, sometimes returning to the vulgate, sometimes adopting conjectures—following (so it seems) no fixed principle, save the dictates of his taste. What is more, he often departs from these standard texts without giving the reader any notice that he does so, either in the commentary or in the apparatus.2 There is, unfortunately, no list of such divergences. All this, when joined with the ordained brevity of the apparatus generally, means that one cannot use Gagarin’s text without having a critical edition always open before one. In Antiphon 5, just 22 pages of Greek, I count approximately 40 instances where Gagarin diverges from Thalheim-Blass without alerting the reader either in the commentary or in the apparatus. The specifics, moreover, are instructive. These include: 5.3 tòν δυναμένον λέγειν; 4 αίτησαις υμῖν; 5 δάδε ἄν (A*); 11 οὗ! ἀν πολλά (mss.); 12 ἀνάθες (see above, 733, n. 2) 14 τούς τῶν κατηγορίων λόγους (see Th.-B. app. crit. ad loc.); 17 πάσοις ἐδέξει (N); 26 αὐτό (N); 27 οὗτος αὐτή ἄλλο (N); 32 δὲ τι ἄν (adopted, nicely, from the Aldine by Maitzen); ibid., τοῦτο (which apparently has no ms. authority, and is just an old conjecture, 'quo non iam opus est'), by Saupe; ibid., αὐτό (Bliss, elegantly); 38 αὐτοῖς δὲ; 42 εἰρμάνοις (simply a conjecture by the scribe of N [7]; the text, it seems, was already corrupt in the archetype); 45 τε (see below, n. 1; cp. 5.60 ὁδὲ ἔκειν [N], 76 ἐκ [I]); 47 ἐγένεσθε (Schoell; cp. 51 γεγένομεν, 52 γεγένετο); 55 τοῦτο γ’ (Jernstedt: τοῦτον ms. et plur. edd.); 57 nata; 59 οὗτος (Maitzen); ibid., ἐδέσε με (ἢ ἐμ’; surely); 70 ἄκεχον (AN Maitzen: ἄκεχον plur. edd.; cp. Pom; ἄκεχον, 69); 74 καταστροφή γε (N); not in ms. ἄναθες (N); 19 καταστροφήν δεις etc.; despite, e.g., Andoc. 1.72; 76 παράκεισθαι (Hirschg); 77 ἐχειρήσεις (mss., but cp. κατατέθησιν); 80-81 (see above, 733, n. 2); 89 ἀμαρτείν (bene: Th. hic errat); 91 χρή τούτο γε (but Bliss’ χρή seems to be required). A text presented thus has limited value, even apart from the quality of these particular readings.

As regards this quality, the attentive reader will doubtless be able to form his or her own judgment from the foregoing instances. It is nice to see Gagarin defend Bekker’s κατόντως at 2.19, Bliss’ αὐτό at 5.32 and εἰπὲ at 6.9 (cp. §46 εἰπὲ ἠξίκυνθον), and plausible solutions are offered at 3.2.6, 6.16 (ὁμοίως) and 17. But consider 1.10 βασιλιστάς τε (which fatally breaks the logic of the passage; cp. §11 τοῦτο μέν ἄλλως τοῦτο δέ); 2.4.7 κυρίων (see above, 734, n. 2); 3.2.1, where καταστάσθηκαν or the like is required; 3.2.7 ἔμελτα (N; cp. Dover, CG 44, 1950, 46n.1) 4.1.2 τρόφες τε παρέδωκε (omitting xal), etc.

Readers should be aware, finally, that Gagarin often proposes new paragraph divisions; these divisions have interpretative value and must be evaluated independently in every case.4 Furthermore, he does not print the hypotheses or, for the *Tertalogies,* the titles found in the manuscript tradition. This decision would have been defensible were this a more rigorous text, since these titles and the hypotheses derive from later, rhetorical school traditions.5 But in a text of this sort, it would have been useful to have these to hand.

The commentary itself is serviceable, and will certainly help students get through the text. Not surprisingly, Gagarin tends to focus on the many legal issues raised by the speeches, and it is precisely in his discussion of such legal technicalities that Gagarin’s commentary will prove most useful. Many of the particular notes are quite good. In this regard, though the points will not always be free of controversy. The introductory set-ups for each case are especially clear, and will serve as a nice complement to those provided by Gernet and Maidment. But Antiphon is more than a sourcebook on Attic law, and Gagarin’s treatment of the linguistic and rhetorical aspects of the text is less successful. The commentary is directed (at least in part) towards undergraduates. Yet there is no note, as one might expect, on (e.g.) 5.60 αὐτό, on the use of ὁς + pple. (see below), or on the polite use of μι μι ("please") at 5.35 or 5.46. At 6.1 ἄνθρωπον ὑπάρχει surely needs comment (see Barigazzi ad loc.) more than does ἄνθρωπος ὑπάρχει μή ὃ ὢ ἢ ὃ ὢ ἢ ὃ μ. Likewise, at 7.5 καὶ εἶ (miror 5) is certainly more difficult than καθέσθητί. At other times, notes may appear to be insufficient (e.g., 1.3 κατά τὸ ἀνόητον; 2.2.2 παρέχεται μὴ διαφθορθήσατι; 2.4.10 ὅσον ὅσον; 3.2.6 ἐν δὲ without comment), or inaccurate (on the allegedly concessive use of ἐκεῖ ... γε at 5.50, 6.9, 14, etc., see Tulin, op. cit., 89). More broadly, far too little attention is devoted to analysis of the actual logic of the arguments (as, say, the enthymeme at 2.1.4-8), or to the compositional structure of specific passages (contrast, e.g., Gagarin, 118f. [ad Ant. 1.21-24], with the excellent note at Barigazzi 1, 64f.). Such omissions are critical, and much work thus remains to be done on the argumentative and rhetorical strategies of this author—especially as regards the *Tertalogies.* Compare, in all this, the very full exposition in Adams’ *Lysis,* also composed for undergraduates.

The best section of the commentary is no doubt that on Antiphon 5, *De caede Herodis.* Gagarin gives, with admirable brevity, a clear and excellent introduction to the case as a whole (173-77), reasserting his view (MH passim; also Due, 50), that Buthhtes may have been guilty all along. The introductory set-ups to the individual sections of the speech are also well done. I append a few comments and observations. 5.8 πρῶτον μὲν σὺν, ὡς παρανοοῦσα κτήσ.: for this choice of opening, cp. Andoc. 1.8. 5.9 φῶνοι διῆλθε φῶνο: "the expression also suggests" equivalencies, given Gagarin’s more forceful position elsewhere (MH 19n.7); in fact, the pple. ἐνδεχόμενος is concessive 4 I would prefer, e.g., to follow Declève Calzzi at 2.1.9 and 2.4.10: also at 3.2.10 (which should not, I think, be part of the epilogue). At 1.8 we probably need to break after φῆσθαι (with Barigazzi).

See remarks, derived, presumably, from two different traditions, since the titles certainly reflect an analysis of the *Tertalogies* according to the types of murder involved, rather than by status theory.
and the whole sentence refers to the prosecution's mishandling of procedure: “Though I have been indicted as a kakourgos, I am actually (not legally, to be sure, but for all intents and purposes) having to defend a δίκη φόνου” (see, most recently, B. Manuwald, Rh. Mus. 138, 1995, 48-50; cp. §§11-12, 16 ἕλαν θ' ὁ ... ὡς τοῦ φόνου τὴν δίκην ἀφλάκοτα (obviously, ὡς introduces a subjective element, as in ὡς ... ἀκοπτήθη, 32 ὡς ὅταν λέγεται, 41 ὡς δίκαια ἀπολυμένον), διὸ ἐν δὲ κτλ., etc.; the καί that follows must be adversative: “and yet, they themselves bear witness to this, that I am not a kakourgos, for ...”; Gagarin has little to say, unfortunately, regarding particles. 5.10 (av): add MH 25n.24 (also, the comma ought to be retained after τὴν κρίσιν). 5.16 ἀδίκωτος; cp. Manuwald, 45. 5.18 διὰ τὴν τοῦ σφυκτοῦ κακοπάθεται (del. Dobree et alii: Gagarin (cp. Due, 51n.7) correctly defends this phrase; for the A-B-A structure (not simply, as Gagarin says, "repetition"), see 3 bis, esp. πολλά δὲ ... πιστοὶ γεγονόντο τῇ παράδειγμα, τοῦτο ἐσόφθαν, διὸτι ἐγένετο; also 31, 35 (τεθωρεῖ δὲ ... ἀπολυμένον): Andoc. 1.6, etc. 5.19 ἐκ πολλά ... παραδειγματίκα: see Edwards; also Pl. Apol. 182b-19A2, 24A1-4, 37A6-B2. 5.21: οὗ προσφυγή, rest: but contrast MH 36n.16, which should therefore have been cited. 5.25 τὸ ἀδῆρα καί τὸ γεγονόν: variatio (cp. 5.3, 5.72) is no argument against hendiatres; on hendiatres in Greek oratory, see now Laura Rossi, "Il Problema dell'endiaedi in Greco e le orazioni politiche di Demostene," AION (sez. filolog.-lett.) 15, 1993, 121-44 (pub. 1995). 5.29-30: discussion of the many interesting problems surrounding the witnesses—including the torturing of a free man—is much too abbreviated; Gagarin does, admittedly, refer to earlier discussions, including his own; still, an elementary commentary of this sort ought to be more self-contained; contrast Edwards, 88ff. 5.30 οὔδὲν ... φλάβουρν: Gagarin ad loc. (MH passim; Edwards, 83f.) finds this “surprisingly weak”; but 42 δὲ ἄγα (sc. the free man) τὸ παράδειγμα ἑκείνου ἐκ τοῦ παράδειγμα is unequivocal; whether it is, true of course, is another matter. 5.37 μὲν οὖν: cp. 3.1.1 (οἷοι μὲν οὖν; 3.4.8; Pl. Apol. 36A7 (with de Strzygowski-Stilins ad loc.). 5.43 ἡ δὲ: Gagarin’s comment that “only here does Eu claim (rather vaguely) that he only enlisted help after the crime was accomplished”, is confusing; rather, Euxitheos argues, ex contrario (see above, 732, n. 3), that he would not have acted thus. 5.44 ὡς ὁ τοῦτον λόγον: that Herodes was slain near the harbor was only an inference (cp. 25 ἐκ τοῦ γένει γὰρ κτλ.; hence, we have here a fine example of what Due (41f.) refers to as Antiphon’s tendency to advance “from probability to certainty”. 5.48 δοῦλα: Gagarin takes the divine in the usual manner, with ἔχειτι (it is permitted for a slave to testify ...); Pl. Laws 935A6-B1 δοῦλα δὲ καί δοῦλα καί ράφει φάνον μόνον ἔχειτι, μαρτυρεῖν καὶ εὐφημορεῖν is decisive (on ὑμνημοροεῖν, however, see England ad n5f.); see Tulin, “Slave Witnesses in Antiphon V.48,” Scripta Classica Israelitica (forthcoming). 5.49 οὐδέποτε νῦν (cp. MH 64) simply = "never"; see 68 οὐδέποτε νῦν ἦνῃν, ὡς ἀποκλείει τοις ἑπικεκίνειται. 5.64-66: that the culprit is often the first to 'finger' someone else (οὐ μὲν γὰρ πανυπομονοῦσιν κτλ.) is, indeed, psychologically sound, and is a principle often used in the modern crime story; Euxitheos' strategy is therefore effective; see Due, 46f. 5.73: on the λόγος/ἔργος contrast in Antiphon (Gagarin ad 3.3.1; Edwards, 70), add Gebauer, 31ff.n.37. 5.76 ἡμαρτ. the references are supplied by Edwards; on τούτως-ἐκτός, add Diggle, Ill. Class. Stud. 19, 1994, 81f. 5.78 χαρακτ. "found in a letter attributed to the early philosopher Thales" will not do; οἷος τοῦ θαλός ἑπιστολάι (Diog. Laert. 1.43-44) are clearly apocryphal, as the letter itself indicates ἑμεῖς δὲ οἱ μὲν γράψαντες; see Schmid-Stählin, 1.1, 728n.9; also Zeller-Nestle, Phil. d. Gr. 1.1, 256n.2. 5.91 σοβερέμβα τὴν σοματικά is not really "sin", which is anachronistic, but (as it were) ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιμέλεια (cp. 3.88 ἄνθρωπο ... εἰς τό τοις θεοῖς; 93 μηδὲν αὐτῷ συνειδότα ... μὴς εἰς τούς θεοῖς ἀντικινεῖτο. 5.93 τούτο αὐτὸ is not "he was false", but "this very fact", i.e., τὸ εὐφημορεῖ. Of the fragments, finally, Gagarin gives only an excerpt from περὶ τῆς μεταστάσεως; for the full particulars of this fragmentary text, see Decelea Caizzi, CPF 1.1 [1989], 224-36. The book concludes with a select bibliography and several indices. With one understandable exception—Gagarin’s own “The Torture of Slaves in Athenian Law,” (CP 91, 1996, 1-18)—nothing past 1995 is cited. Still, several omissions should be noted: G. Ramirez Vidal, “El logos AMARTYROS en Antifonte,” in La Rhetorique Greco. Actes du Colloque "Octave Narbonne," 3° coll. intern., CRHN—Dec. 1992 (Paris, 1994), 147-62; J. Diggle, “EΦΕΕΡΟΣ Εγίνων Αντιφόνον, De caede Herodis 17,” Ill. Class. Stud. 19, 1994, 81f; B. Manuwald, “Zur rechtlichen Problematik von Antiphon, Or. 5,” Rh. Mus. 138, 1995, 41-59; A. L. Boegehold, The Athenian Agora, XXVIII. The Lawcourts at Athens (Princeton, 1995); Ch. Eucken, “Das Tötungsgesetz des Antiphon und der Sinn seiner Tetrastolos,” Mus. Helv. 53, 1996, 73-82; also E. Grace, VDL 1992 (no. 4), 28-46 and 1993 (no.1), 25-39 (in Russian). Despite the comments and criticisms offered above, it is useful to have this volume, and to learn, in more systematic fashion, Gagarin’s views on many of the problems raised by the text of Antiphon. The appearance of this commentary will no doubt stimulate new discussion of this important author.

Alexander Tulin, Howard University