
In this brief but useful 1995 Tübingen dissertation, Gondos considers some of the most salient rhetorical *topoi*, stratagems, and arguments to be found in late fifth-century *literary* texts (e.g., Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides, Antiphon), so as to examine which, and to what extent, matters discussed in theoretical treatises (Aristotle and the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*) can be paralleled in earlier usage, thereby marking the distinction, if we may paraphrase from Locke (Gondos, 1–6, 91), between *rhetorica utens* and *rhetorica docens*. Not surprisingly, the author finds that many of the ideas and observations ("Bemerkungen") described in the later theoretical treatises are already utilized and manipulated—indeed, deliberately and consciously so—in these earlier literary texts.

In a rapid but sober review of a range of rhetorical phenomena, Gondos surveys the following topics: *ethopolia* and *diabole* ("Der Person des Redners"); 7–23; discussions of audience psychology ("Publikums-Psychologie"), especially that of the Athenian *demos* (24–39); manipulation of *pathos* ("Gefühlsstrategien"), notably pity, joy, anger, and fear, each of which is treated singly (40–59); finally, rational argumentation ("Rationale Mittel"),
under two heads: one dealing with the use of different types of argument, such as "Rechtsargument" and "Der Darlegung des Nutzens" (61–71); the other dealing with what Gondos terms "Belege" (71–90), and which includes sections of the use of μαρτύριον as "sign" or "indication," σημεία, τεκμήρια, παραδείγματα, and εἰκός.

Gondos offers, in passing, some fine observations of her own: e.g., on the intentional use of diable and the manipulation of mass psychology as evidenced in Thucydidaean speeches; on the profound psychological foundations of the appeal to ἐλεος in what we might call pitié (45, n.43, with Eur. Andr., 421 f.); on τεκμήριο, already in Homer (77, nn.120–21), but which almost never, she claims, conveys certainty (Eur. Med., 516ff. notwithstanding), but only degrees of "reliability" ("vertrauenswürdigen")—in contrast with Ar. Rhet., 1357b3 (80). In discussing eikos-arguments, Gondos is careful to note how the use of this type of reasoning (though already found in h. Hermes) develops, in fact, quite slowly; apart from Antiphan the orator (86), whose writings cannot be dated with any confidence, deliberate manipulation of this mode of argument is actually missing from texts where we would otherwise expect to find it—e.g., in Gorgias’ Helen (88, n.211), in the Clouds, in Thuc. 3.37ff., etc.

In all this, Gondos adduces clear and unequivocal evidence not only for the occasional use of rhetorical strategies in late fifth-century literary texts—after all, much of this can already be found by implication in epic speeches—but, more importantly, she provides ample evidence for an explicit and self-conscious "Reflection" within these literary texts, on the very nature and effectiveness of these same strategies. Traces of such "reflection" do not occur in the extant literary record, however, until the 420s—about the time, in fact, as the author notes, of Gorgias’ supposed sojourn in Athens (427 b.c; 93, n.21). And so, while she wisely refuses to dogmatize on its causes and origin, the author concludes, persuasively, "dass im ausgehenden fünfnten Jahrhundert in Athen eine rhetorische Diskussion im Gange war" (93). This, in turn, would seem to hint, though Gondos does not herself quite draw out the inference (but see 1, n.6; also G. H. Goebel, Mnemosyne 92 [1989] 49, n.20; G. Pendrick, RM 141 [1998] 21), that there may have been more precept (as opposed to mere specimen) in early rhetoric than some havc traditionally allowed.

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CW 93.2 (1999)